The Risk of Zealous Advocacy: Litigators Receiving Anonymously Disclosed Documents and the Notification Requirement by Spendley, Rebecca J.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 3 Article 9 
2021 
The Risk of Zealous Advocacy: Litigators Receiving Anonymously 
Disclosed Documents and the Notification Requirement 
Rebecca J. Spendley 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rebecca J. Spendley, The Risk of Zealous Advocacy: Litigators Receiving Anonymously Disclosed 
Documents and the Notification Requirement, 90 Fordham L. Rev. 1397 (2021). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol90/iss3/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 
1397 
THE RISK OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY:  
LITIGATORS RECEIVING ANONYMOUSLY 
DISCLOSED DOCUMENTS AND THE 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 
Rebecca J. Spendley* 
 
The American Bar Association (ABA) created the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct to provide guidance to lawyers, courts, and the entire 
legal profession regarding what a lawyer’s ethical duties entail.  Model Rule 
4.4(b) requires a lawyer to notify opposing counsel once the receiving lawyer 
knows, or reasonably should know, that the documents received were 
inadvertently sent.  The ABA, however, explicitly left documents disclosed 
intentionally and without authorization beyond the scope of the rules, thus 
leaving lawyers who receive these documents with little guidance.  Courts 
have taken varying approaches to handling documents of this type:  some 
analogize unauthorized disclosures to inadvertent disclosures and mandate 
notice for documents provided by anonymous third parties, while others 
instead refuse to impose a notification requirement. 
This Note discusses the conflict about the notification requirement and 
anonymously disclosed documents.  It examines the arguments for and 
against mandating notice to the opposing party in these situations.  This Note 
proposes that notice should be required for intentional disclosures made by 
anonymous third parties because these documents can be analogized to those 
addressed in Model Rule 4.4(b), which implements a notice requirement for 
inadvertent disclosures.  This Note then discusses how the ABA is in the best 
position to resolve the inconsistencies discussed and proposes a revised 
Model Rule 4.4(b) to help alleviate the uncertainty in this realm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Just as the primary methods of communication have evolved and changed 
with the times, so too have the legal ethics rules governing communications.  
Alongside this evolution comes new dilemmas for lawyers trying to 
determine what their ethical duties entail.1  The American Bar Association 
(ABA) originally adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the 
“Model Rules”) in 1983 and has continued to revise them since, in part to 
help law firms keep up to date with the internet and other technology.2  While 
the Model Rules address some of the ethical quandaries a lawyer may face,3 
there remain many situations in which lawyers might find themselves without 
clear guidance as to what their ethical obligations are.4 
A lawyer has an obligation to “zealously . . . protect and pursue a client’s 
legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law,”5 but there must be limits 
to that obligation.6  For example, perhaps a lawyer receives an email, with 
no indication as to the sender’s identity,7 containing documents which are 
extremely helpful to one of the lawyer’s ongoing cases.  The lawyer cannot 
ascertain any information about the source of the documents but knows they 
are valuable documents that are clearly confidential and perhaps protected by 
attorney-client privilege.8  This Note explores situations such as this 
 
 1. See generally Bruce Green, Handle with Care, 42 AM. BAR ASS’N LITIG. J. 9 (2016). 
 2. Ronald D. Rotunda, Applying the Revised ABA Model Rules in the Age of the Internet:  
The Problem of Metadata, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 176 (2013). 
 3. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
 4. See infra Parts I.A–B, II. 
 5. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. 
 6. See infra notes 229–33 and accompanying text. 
 7. This could occur because the documents are sent from a fake email address, for 
example, which can mask the sender’s identity. 
 8. Determining whether the documents are confidential or privileged is often irrelevant 
to the court’s determination of the lawyer’s ethical duties. See infra Parts I.C.2.c, II. 
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hypothetical and examines whether a lawyer who receives9 anonymously 
provided documents10 should be required to notify opposing counsel to avoid 
court-imposed sanctions.11 
Unauthorized disclosures occur when a third party deliberately sends 
information to a lawyer that the lawyer is not authorized to have.12  While 
there are many facets of unauthorized disclosures,13 this Note only discusses 
solutions in the context of anonymously disclosed documents.  In a time 
when hacking and cybersecurity breaches are increasingly frequent, 
anonymous disclosures leave many lingering questions,14 and this Note seeks 
to resolve some of these uncertainties. 
Although the ABA has contemplated bringing unauthorized disclosures 
within the scope of the Model Rules, it ultimately decided that these 
documents were best left to the discretion of the courts.  Only inadvertent 
disclosures, therefore, are included in Model Rule 4.4(b).15  The ABA’s 
explicit omission has led to inconsistent decisions from courts tasked with 
handling unauthorized disclosures, which in turn has sown confusion among 
lawyers finding themselves in these situations.16  This Note argues that 
anonymous disclosures—which are presumed to be given without 
authorization from the owner of the documents because the documents are 
detrimental to the opposition’s case—should be subject to a mandatory notice 
requirement.  This Note subsequently contends that because the ABA is in 
the best position to provide such guidance, the ABA should revise Model 
 
 9. This Note does not discuss situations in which the lawyer personally plays a role in 
obtaining the documents because this is generally seen as unethical. See supra Part I.E.1.  It 
instead focuses specifically on instances in which an anonymous third party provides the 
documents. 
 10. This Note focuses on litigators’ ethical obligations.  Transactional lawyers, who 
generally practice outside the courtroom, are not formal discovery process participants and 
thus have different obligations. But see generally Paula Schaefer, Transactional Lawyers and 
Inadvertent Disclosure, 13 TRANSACTIONS:  TENN. J. BUS. L. 107 (2011) (arguing that 
transactional lawyers also need inadvertent disclosure protections).  Litigators face unique 
problems in this realm because there is a risk of inadvertent disclosure during discovery and 
because the presiding judge could decide, among other things, to waive attorney-client 
privilege or to sanction the lawyer for improper conduct pertaining to improperly discovered 
documents. See generally Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 
WL 2831485 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 392 
(N.D. Ill. 2010).  This Note, when discussing notice obligations, generally refers to the 
obligation to provide notice to opposing counsel, which is the notification requirement 
imposed in Model Rule 4.4(b). See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b). 
 11. This Note discusses court-imposed sanctions only; therefore, discipline imposed by 
state bar associations is beyond its scope. 
 12. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 94-382 (1994). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Ransomware Attacks Grow, Crippling Cities and 
Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/09/technology/ 
ransomware-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/2LZH-K6SN]; David E. Sanger & Nicole 
Perlroth, More Hacking Attacks Found as Officials Warn of ‘Grave Risk’ to U.S. Government, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/17/us/politics/russia-cyber-
hack-trump.html [https://perma.cc/7TYU-F8T5]. 
 15. See infra notes 33–45 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
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Rule 4.4(b) to explicitly bring anonymous disclosures within the purview of 
the Model Rules.17 
Part I provides relevant background information regarding the ABA’s 
history of dealing with inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures and details 
other potentially relevant law.  Part II examines opposing viewpoints 
regarding whether notice should be mandatory for documents disclosed by 
an anonymous third party.  Part III proposes a revised ABA Model Rule that 
would be the most efficient solution to the problem of notice and 
anonymously disclosed documents. 
I.  INADVERTENT DISCLOSURES AND UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES 
The receipt of unauthorized documents18 continues to present a gray area 
in lawyering ethics.19  To start, this part discusses the background of 
inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures.  Part I.A explains the distinction 
between inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures.  Part I.B provides a brief 
overview of how the ABA has previously addressed unauthorized 
disclosures.  Part I.C examines other laws that can be helpful when 
determining a lawyer’s obligations since unauthorized disclosures fall 
beyond the scope of the ethical rules.  Part I.D highlights the conflicting 
interests contemplated when lawyers question their ethical duties.  Lastly, 
Part I.E discusses how the method of obtaining the documents may impact 
the notice obligation. 
A.  Defining Unauthorized and Inadvertent Disclosures 
The key difference between inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures is 
that an unauthorized disclosure results from the provider’s deliberate, not 
mistaken, disclosure.  Inadvertent disclosures generally refer to instances 
where the sender of the information in question did not intend to make the 
disclosure.20  Conversely, a lawyer may also receive materials from a source 
who deliberately sends them to the lawyer without permission from the 
document’s owner—an unauthorized disclosure.21  This situation is often 
seen in wrongful termination and qui tam22 proceedings where the client or 
third party (often an employee or former employee of the opposing party or 
 
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
 18. In this Note, “documents” refers to electronic or physical copies of information.  This 
Note does not cover verbally disseminated information. 
 19. See generally Mitchell James Kendrick, Comment, A Shot in the Dark:  The Need to 
Clearly Define a Lawyer’s Obligations Upon the Intentional Receipt of Documents from an 
Anonymous Third Party, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 753 (2019).  See also infra notes 33–45 and 
accompanying text. 
 20. See James M. Fischer, Ethically Handling the Receipt of Possibly Privileged 
Information, 1 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 200, 206 (2011). 
 21. Id. at 221.  When discussing unauthorized disclosures, there could be implications of 
breaches of contract, fiduciary duties, or similar claims.  However, this Note focuses solely on 
the lawyer’s duties and whether the lawyer breached an ethical duty. 
 22. Qui tam proceedings are statutory claims that allow a private person to sue for a 
penalty, part of which the government or some public institution will receive. See Qui Tam 
Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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a whistleblower) delivers information believed to be useful to the party 
opposing the party’s former employer.23  Unauthorized disclosures occur 
when the person who obtains or sends the documents does so without 
permission from the original owner of the documents.24  These are two 
distinct types of disclosures; however, treatment of them is intertwined. 
B.  The ABA’s History with Inadvertent and Unauthorized Disclosures 
The ABA has previously addressed inadvertent and unauthorized 
disclosures but ultimately decided to withdraw the formal opinion that 
discussed unauthorized disclosures, thus leaving other relevant law to govern 
them.25  Part I.B.1 introduces the ABA Model Rules.  Part I.B.2 discusses 
the relevant ABA formal opinions. 
1.  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Rule 4.4(b) 
The ABA’s Model Rules provide a basis for ethical guidelines for 
lawyers.26  Although each state has its own version of ethics rules, many 
states’ rules are based on the Model Rules.27  Approximately two-thirds of 
the states, along with the District of Columbia, have adopted the Model 
Rules, while several other states have developed hybrid rules based off the 
Model Rules’ predecessor, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 
or have created their own unique versions of legal ethics rules by making 
amendments to any of these sources.28  The Model Rules themselves are not 
inherently binding and only take on the force of law to the extent that they 
influence what version(s) the states adopt as their own legal ethics rules.29 
There are a few rules a lawyer may consider when dealing with 
anonymously disclosed documents.  First, Model Rule 4.2 prohibits 
communication about the subject matter of the representation between a 
lawyer and a person the lawyer knows to be represented unless the lawyer 
has the consent of that individual’s lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.30  
Model Rule 8.4, a more general provision, prohibits a lawyer from engaging 
in criminal or dishonest conduct.31  Model Rule 8.4(d) prohibits lawyers from 
engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”32 
 
 23. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 221. 
 24. See id. at 221–22. 
 25. See id. at 229–30. 
 26. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
 27. See, e.g., Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Indiana 
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as its Rules of Professional Conduct in 
1987.”). 
 28. Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a Litigant’s Former 
Employees:  Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, Privilege Doctrines, and 
Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV. 868, 884–85 (2003). 
 29. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168–69 (1986) (discussing how once Iowa 
adopted the ethics rule, it became binding on all lawyers who appear in courts in Iowa). 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.2. 
 31. Id. r. 8.4. 
 32. Id. r. 8.4(d). 
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Most important to this Note, Model Rule 4.4(b) states that “[a] lawyer who 
receives a document or electronically stored information . . . and knows or 
reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored 
information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”33  
Adopted in 2002, Rule 4.4(b) was written as a compromise.  By only 
requiring notification and nothing further (such as returning the document), 
the rule permits the sending lawyer to “take whatever steps might be 
necessary or available to protect the interests of the sending lawyer’s 
client.”34  Model Rule 4.4(b), however, is silent regarding the ethical 
implications of documents that are sent intentionally rather than 
inadvertently.35  A comment36 to Model Rule 4.4 further elaborates that this 
rule does not involve receipt of stolen documents but rather merely addresses 
the issue of lawyers receiving something by mistake.37  Model Rule 4.4(b) 
states the lawyer must know (actually or constructively) that the information 
was inadvertently sent38 but provides no guidance as to how the lawyer 
would determine this.39  Model Rule 4.4(b) only addresses the notice 
obligation—leaving any further steps needed to be taken by the lawyer to 
considerations of privilege and waiver—and thus leaves the resolution of the 
issue to the application of case law and other relevant law.40 
In the annotations41 to Model Rule 4.4, the ABA Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the “Committee”) acknowledges the 
lack of consistency in the adoption and application of Model Rule 4.4(b).42  
The annotations address unauthorized disclosures and acknowledge that 
many courts have chosen to expand the scope of Model Rule 4.4(b) beyond 
its existing minimum requirement.43  The annotations concede that the rule 
“tempers the zeal with which the lawyer is permitted to represent a client” 
but confirm that the scope of the rule, as written, does not reach unauthorized 
 
 33. Id. r. 4.4(b). 
 34. CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:  THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2005, at 556 (2006). 
 35. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b). 
 36. The comments do not add obligations to the Model Rules but rather provide guidance 
on how to interpret the Model Rules. Id. pmbl. 
 37. Id. r. 4.4(b) cmt. 2. 
 38. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (“‘Knowingly,’ ‘known,’ or ‘knows’ 
denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question.  A person’s knowledge may be inferred from 
circumstances.”); id. r. 1.0(j) (“‘Reasonably should know’ . . . denotes that a lawyer of 
reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.”). 
 39. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 207. 
 40. See id. at 208; see infra Part I.C.2. 
 41. The Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct is an ABA publication that 
discusses how courts, disciplinary bodies, and ethics committees apply the Model Rules. See 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/products/inv/book/364918796/ [https://perma.cc/4T73-V9GD] 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
 42. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 43. Id. 
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disclosures.44  The Model Rules, therefore, result in significant ambiguity for 
lawyers dealing with intentionally produced documents.45 
2.  The ABA’s Formal Opinions 
In addition to the Model Rules themselves, the ABA has published 
numerous formal opinions that shed light on the history of the ABA’s 
treatment of unauthorized and inadvertent disclosures.  These opinions are 
not binding but are merely advisory and explain how the ABA would 
interpret certain provisions or situations.46  The ABA first addressed the issue 
of inadvertent disclosures in Formal Opinion 92-368, which placed ethical 
obligations squarely on the receiving lawyer and required the receiving 
lawyer to refrain from examining the materials, notify the sending lawyer, 
and abide by the sending lawyer’s instructions.47  However, no 
corresponding model rule supported this position.48 
Next, before adopting Model Rule 4.4(b), the Committee issued Formal 
Opinion 94-382 and placed obligations on lawyers who received unsolicited 
confidential or privileged documents that were intentionally disclosed 
without authorization.49  The Committee recognized that inadvertent 
disclosures and unauthorized disclosures were similar because, in both 
situations, the disclosure was nonconsensual from the adverse party’s 
perspective.50  However, the Committee noted two dissimilarities:  (1) with 
inadvertent disclosures, the transmitting party does not intend to send the 
materials and (2) unauthorized disclosures may involve situations evidencing 
improper conduct.51  Notwithstanding these differences, the Committee 
concluded that the lawyer’s obligations should be the same for both 
inadvertent disclosures and unauthorized disclosures.52 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Formal Op. 
2019-3 (2019) (discussing how Rule 4.4(b) does not address further obligations of the 
receiving lawyer and noting that “[s]ubstantive law, procedural rules, judicial decisions, court 
orders, and/or agreements between the parties typically will impose additional obligations or 
restrictions”). 
 46. See In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 349 n.1, 350, 354 (Tex. 1998) (discussing how the 
formal opinion on which the court of appeals relied is merely advisory and does not impose a 
binding standard); see also Publications:  Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/ 
[https://perma.cc/6WKD-DVP3] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021) (“ABA Formal Ethics Opinions 
are interpretations of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .  [They] are not binding 
authority in any jurisdiction without adoption in such a jurisdiction.  They are persuasive 
authority and express policy of the American Bar Association.”). 
 47. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 92-368 (1992). 
 48. See Tory L. Lucas, Rethinking Lawyer Ethics to Allow the Rules of Evidence, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and Private Agreements to Control Ethical Obligations Involving 
Inadvertent Disclosures, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235, 242 (2019) (criticizing Formal Opinion 
92-368 and noting that the Committee did not define and apply an ethics rule but rather placed 
significant weight on the preamble). 
 49. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 94-382 (1994). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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However, after the ABA adopted Model Rule 4.4(b) in 2002, it withdrew 
Formal Opinion 94-382 in its entirety because the Model Rules no longer 
supported it.53  In its place, the Committee released Formal Opinion 06-440, 
which makes clear that Model Rule 4.4(b) does not apply to intentionally sent 
documents disclosed without authorization and that the lawyer’s action in 
those situations is beyond the scope of the Model Rules.54  Lastly, the 
Committee confirmed in Formal Opinion 11-460 that the lawyer has no duty 
to notify the opposing party under the Model Rules when dealing with 
intentionally sent documents that are disclosed without authorization.55  In 
this formal opinion, however, the Committee did advise lawyers to proceed 
with caution and not risk a potential ethical violation when dealing with 
confidential and privileged documents.56 
The ABA has continued to go back and forth in deciding how best to deal 
with intentional disclosures of documents.57  Currently, even when the Model 
Rules are viewed together with the formal opinions, there is still a void in 
guidance for lawyers dealing with unauthorized disclosures.58 
C.  Unauthorized Disclosures Are Beyond the Scope of the Model Rules 
Because the ABA explicitly situates unauthorized disclosures beyond the 
scope of the Model Rules,59 lawyers must turn to other law and courts’ 
jurisprudence when navigating this issue.  Part I.C.1 discusses courts’ role as 
the ultimate authority in determining a lawyer’s ethical duties.  Part I.C.2 
briefly examines how unauthorized disclosures may be governed by the laws 
concerning privilege. 
1.  Courts’ Role in Lawyering Ethics 
Because ethics rules generally fail to prescribe the appropriate action for 
recipients of unauthorized disclosures, it is often left to the discretion of the 
 
 53. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) (withdrawing Formal 
Opinion 94-382 in its entirety).  Formal Opinion 94-382 remains relevant because some courts 
have continued to rely on it despite the ABA’s withdrawal. See Kendrick, supra note 19, at 
762–63 (discussing how some courts, in determining the proper course of conduct dealing 
with intentionally disclosed documents, relied on withdrawn ABA formal opinions); see, e.g., 
Burt Hill v. Hassan, No. Civ.A. 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010) 
(referencing Formal Opinion 94-382). 
 54. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) (“[T]here is no Model 
Rule that addresses the duty of a recipient of [intentionally] transmitted information.”).  This 
opinion also addresses the fact that there might be other law or other obligations beyond Model 
Rule 4.4(b). Id. 
 55. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 11-460 (2011). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence K. Hellman, When 
“Ethics Rules” Don’t Mean What They Say:  The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics 
Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 334 (1996) (noting that the ABA formal ethics 
opinions often set forth the ABA Ethics Committee’s “view of what the rules should say or 
were meant to say” rather than reflect a straightforward rule that leaves little to interpret). 
 58. See infra Part II.  See generally Kendrick, supra note 19. 
 59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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courts to step in and decipher the complicated set of applicable laws.60  The 
Model Rules make clear that “[t]he legal profession is largely 
self-governing.”61  Because of this self-governing nature, the ultimate 
authority is found in the court system.62  Courts may look beyond the ethics 
rules, given a court’s “responsibility to preserve a reasonable balance 
between the need to ensure ethical conduct on the part of lawyers appearing 
before it and other social interests.”63  Courts thus have the discretion to 
decide if attorneys have violated their moral and ethical responsibilities and, 
if so, to fashion appropriate remedies; this leads to many inconsistencies 
among jurisdictions.64 
2.  Attorney-Client Privilege and Privilege Waiver 
Courts may also draw on relevant law beyond the ethics rules to determine 
a lawyer’s obligations.65  Many of the documents in question, such as those 
disclosed by a former employee in the examples discussed above, may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege covering the communications 
between the former employer and the employer’s counsel.66  The 
attorney-client privilege is the result of an evidentiary rule that, at a high 
level, allows both a lawyer or a client to refuse to disclose certain 
communications67 between the attorney and the client.68  This protection 
encourages the client to disclose everything that is pertinent to the attorney’s 
representation without fear that the communication will be used to the 
client’s detriment, which in turn allows the attorney to represent the client to 
the best of the attorney’s ability.69 
 
 60. See generally Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 392 (N.D. 
Ill. 2010); Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010). 
 61. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
 62. Id. (stating that “ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the 
courts”). 
 63. Woods v. Covington Cnty. Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 64. See Richardson v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385–86 (3d Cir. 1972) (“It 
is the duty of the district court to examine the charge, since it is that court which is authorized 
to supervise the conduct of the members of its bar.”); see also Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 
241, 245 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[T]he District Court has a valid interest in regulating the 
qualifications and conduct of counsel . . . .”). 
 65. See supra notes 45, 63 and accompanying text. 
 66. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, at *2 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (noting that some of the anonymously delivered 
documents were stamped “privileged”). 
 67. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68–86 (AM. L. INST. 2000).  The work product doctrine also protects 
attorney work product from discovery. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) 
(establishing the work product doctrine); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 87(3). 
 68. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating the general rule of privileges); see also Jenna C. 
Newmark, Note, The Lawyer’s “Prisoner’s Dilemma”:  Duty and Self-Defense in 
Postconviction Ineffectiveness Claims, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 711–12 (2010). 
 69. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (discussing how the 
purpose of privilege is to “encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and 
their clients”); see also Newmark, supra note 68, at 712. 
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This section discusses the various intricacies of privilege laws, which are 
critical because many unauthorized disclosures are likely to be privileged 
and/or confidential.  Part I.C.2.a discusses the differing views on when 
privilege may be waived.  Part I.C.2.b explains Federal Rule of Evidence 502 
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).  Lastly, Part I.C.2.c 
highlights the differences between confidentiality and privilege and explains 
how the courts tend to handle these distinctions. 
a.  Varying Views on Privilege Waiver 
Model Rule 4.4(b) notes that the issue of privilege waiver is beyond the 
scope of the Model Rules.70  This topic continues to stir debates because of 
the differences in how courts handle it.71  The traditional view states that the 
failure to protect privileged information from unauthorized disclosure72 
destroys documents’ privileged status, placing a strict obligation on the 
owner of the documents.73  The modern view, contrarily, is that the 
unauthorized disclosure of privileged information does not automatically 
destroy the protected status of the information.74 
It is important, however, to distinguish the ethical issues from the privilege 
waiver issues.  The law of waiver does not resolve every issue that emerges.75  
For example, return to the hypothetical of the lawyer who receives valuable 
documents from an anonymous third party.76  In the relevant hypothetical 
jurisdiction, an unauthorized disclosure automatically waives the 
attorney-client privilege.77  Many may then assume that, because the 
privilege has been waived, a lawyer’s ethical obligations become irrelevant 
and the lawyer has the right—maybe even the obligation—to use the 
document as the lawyer sees fit to zealously serve the client’s interests.78  
However, simply because there is “a legal right to use a document does not 
mean that the ethics rules should allow the lawyer to take advantage of that 
 
 70. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) cmt. 2. 
 71. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 223–28. 
 72. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(c) (“A lawyer shall make reasonable 
efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, 
information relating to the representation of a client.”). 
 73. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 223; see also People v. Rittenhouse, 206 P. 86, 88 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1922) (stating that an incriminating note intended for the defendant’s attorney 
from the defendant in his jail cell was privileged, but stating the privilege was waived because 
the defendant did not protect the note from discovery by third parties); David B. Smallman, 
The Purloined Communications Exception to Inadvertent Waiver:  Internet Publication and 
Preservation of Attorney-Client Privilege, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 724–28 (1997) (discussing 
cases addressing the issue of waiver of privilege when confidential information is 
misappropriated). 
 74. Fischer, supra note 20, at 223–24. 
 75. See Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules:  
The Case of Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767, 778 (2005). 
 76. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Smallman, supra note 73, at 723. 
 78. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (“A lawyer 
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in 
advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”); see also Perlman, supra note 75, at 778. 
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right.”79  Therefore, as some commentators argue, the issue of privilege 
waiver does not end the inquiry into whether or not a lawyer’s actions are 
ethical regarding privileged documents.80 
b.  Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(5)(B) 
Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 502 addresses disclosure of a 
communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege.81  
FRE 502(b) states in pertinent part that disclosure does not result in a waiver 
of privilege if the disclosure was inadvertent, the privilege holder took 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure, and the privilege holder took 
reasonable steps to rectify the error (including possibly following Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 26(b)(5)(B)).82  This is a fact-specific 
inquiry assessed on a case-by-case basis.83 
Next, FRCP 26(b)(5) establishes that any claims of privilege must be 
documented in sufficient detail such that other parties can ascertain whether 
the privilege applies.84  FRCP 26(b)(5)(B), also known as the clawback rule, 
imposes no duty on the lawyer who receives inadvertently sent privileged 
information unless and until the lawyer is notified that the information was 
inadvertently sent.85  If the receiving lawyer is notified, the lawyer must 
return, sequester, or destroy the document and any copies.  The receiving 
lawyer must also take reasonable steps to retrieve any information that was 
already disclosed and may not use or disclose the information until the claim 
is resolved.86 
FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) applies during the discovery phase of a civil lawsuit in 
federal court.87  Therefore, if a lawyer receives inadvertently disclosed and 
protected documents during the discovery phase of a federal lawsuit, the 
lawyer must consider the state’s version of Model Rule 4.4(b), FRCP 
26(b)(5)(B), and FRE 502 together.88  On the one hand, unlike Model Rule 
4.4(b), FRCP 26 does not impose any obligations on the receiving party to 
 
 79. Perlman, supra note 75, at 778. 
 80. Id. at 780 (“[W]aiver law does not determine the obligations of lawyers who have 
received inadvertently disclosed, privileged information from an adversary.”).  The issue falls 
more directly within the province of professional ethics and explains why the courts tend to 
treat this as an ethics issue. Id. 
 81. FED. R. EVID. 502.  FRE 502 also concerns communication or information protected 
by the work product doctrine. Id. 
 82. FED. R. EVID. 502(b); see also Ann M. Murphy, Is it Safe?:  The Need for State Ethical 
Rules to Keep Pace with Technological Advances, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1651, 1652 (2012). 
 83. See John M. Barkett, Evidence Rule 502:  The Solution to the Privilege-Protection 
Puzzle in the Digital Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1589, 1595–96 (2013). 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 
 85. Id. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 502; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2021). 
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notify the producing party.89  On the other hand, FRCP 26 imposes greater 
obligations on the receiving lawyer, once notified, to sequester and refrain 
from using the allegedly privileged document; Model Rule 4.4(b) does not 
impose such obligations.90  Lastly, FRE 502(b) determines whether a waiver 
of privilege has occurred.91  These rules, however, do not address the issue 
of intentional, anonymous disclosures, leaving lawyers who receive such 
documents with little guidance.92 
c.  Confidential Versus Privileged Documents 
To cause even more confusion, confidentiality and privilege are sometimes 
conflated in the legal world.93  There are numerous cases in which courts 
even conflate the two principles.94  Confidentiality was developed as a matter 
of professional etiquette, and it is concerned with how lawyers’ relationships 
with their clients should evolve to best serve the legal system.95  Therefore, 
confidentiality rules are extremely broad and cover essentially all 
information that relates to a client’s case, with extremely narrow 
exceptions.96  Many confidential documents, in contrast to privileged 
documents, are subject to discovery or production in court.97 
On the other hand, courts and legislators are the creators of the 
attorney-client privilege rules.98  Judges tend to interpret attorney-client 
privilege narrowly to cover only certain types of communications, with many 
exceptions.99  Due to the narrow construction of attorney-client privilege and 
 
 89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b). 
 90. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); 
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b). 
 91. FED. R. EVID. 502; see also Barkett, supra note 83, at 1598. 
 92. See supra Parts I.C.1–2. 
 93. See Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 
69, 71–72 (1999). 
 94. See, e.g., Vela v. Superior Ct., 255 Cal. Rptr. 921, 924 (Ct. App. 1989) (equating 
confidentiality and privilege for purposes of judicial review); State v. Phelps, 545 P.2d 901, 
903–05 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (confusing privilege and confidentiality). 
 95. Zacharias, supra note 93, at 72–73. 
 96. See id. at 73 (“[P]rofessional confidentiality rules developed extremely broadly, in all 
jurisdictions.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) 
(defining confidential information as all “information relating to representation of a client”).  
The permitted exceptions to confidentiality include revealing information necessary to 
“prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,” to “secure legal advice about 
the lawyer’s compliance” with the Model Rules, or to “prevent the client from committing a 
crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests 
or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s 
services.” Id. r. 1.6(b). 
 97. Zacharias, supra note 93, at 75. 
 98. Id. at 73–74. 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984) (construing 
privilege narrowly); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 
547 (D.D.C. 1970) (holding that “[the privilege] has such an effect on the full disclosure of 
the truth that it must be narrowly construed”); see also Weil v. Inv./Indicators Rsch. & Mgmt., 
Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting the obstacles that the attorney-client privilege 
imposes on the discovery of truth); Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 
1410 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
the fact-sensitive nature of a privilege inquiry, it is often difficult for 
attorneys to predict whether a received document is privileged.100 
Therefore, courts, clients, and lawyers are often confused about the 
differences between confidential and privileged documents.101  As a result, 
some courts have declined to distinguish between the two types of documents 
and have avoided the issue of privilege waiver altogether.102  Consequently, 
it can be difficult for a lawyer, especially when dealing with documents that 
are anonymously delivered, to determine whether a document is privileged 
or confidential just by looking at it.103  For this reason, anonymously 
disclosed documents should be treated the same, regardless of if they are 
privileged or confidential, due to the lack of knowledge on the part of the 
receiving lawyer at the time of receipt. 
D.  Conflicting Interests of a Lawyer’s Duty 
When grappling with the answers to difficult ethical questions, there are a 
multitude of interests at play.104  First, there is the lawyer’s responsibility to 
act in the client’s best interests.105  This notion has been instilled in lawyers 
since their first day of law school.  However, the lawyer is also obligated to 
uphold justice, fairness, and equality and serve the public good.106  Lastly, 
there is the personal interest of lawyers, who want to best serve their career 
and their conscience by remaining ethical and serving their clients to the best 
of their ability.107  The concern arises when these interests are at odds with 
one another and when a lawyer receives a questionable document:  which 
interest should prevail?108 
 
1977) (arguing that because privilege hinders the discovery of truth, it may be strictly 
construed). 
 100. See In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 601 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing how a district court’s 
holding that the attorney-client privilege does not protect communications is a determination 
of fact); Adam Pierson, What’s Yours Is Ours:  Making Sense of Inadvertent Disclosure, 22 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1095, 1099–100 (2009). 
 101. See Zacharias, supra note 93, at 71–72; see also Pierson, supra note 100, at 1099. 
 102. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, at *16 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (“[T]here appears to be no reason to distinguish 
between those documents marked privileged and those which are merely marked confidential 
or proprietary.”). 
 103. See Pierson, supra note 100, at 1099–100.  See generally Kendrick, supra note 19. 
 104. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
 105. Id. (“As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the 
client’s legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications.  As advocate, a 
lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.  As 
negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements 
of honest dealings with others.  As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client’s legal 
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.”). 
 106. Id. (“[A]ll lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic 
influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic 
or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel.  A lawyer should aid the legal 
profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public 
interest.”). 
 107. Id. (discussing the “lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning 
a satisfactory living”). 
 108. See infra Parts II, III.A. 
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E.  The Method of Obtaining Documents 
Ascertaining how documents are obtained is the first step in determining a 
lawyer’s obligations.  For inadvertent disclosures, if the receiving lawyer 
obtained the documents seemingly by mistake, Model Rule 4.4(b) requires 
that the receiving lawyer notify the sending lawyer.109  However, there are 
many questionable methods of obtaining documents.  This section briefly 
discusses the different methods of obtaining information and how these 
methods indicate whether the lawyer has violated an ethical rule or has a 
further ethical obligation beyond using the document in the client’s best 
interest.  This section focuses on two methods of obtaining documents, which 
are generally impermissible and thus beyond the scope of this Note’s 
proposal.  Part I.E.1 highlights the obligations applicable to a lawyer 
soliciting documents, while Part I.E.2 discusses the obligations involving 
illegally obtained documents. 
1.  Solicited Documents 
Solicitation is defined as “[t]he act or an instance of requesting or seeking 
to obtain something.”110  First, Model Rule 4.4(a) states that, when 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not “use methods of obtaining evidence 
that violate the legal rights of [a third party].”111  The “legal rights” protected 
under Rule 4.4(a) include a third party’s right to protect confidential and 
privileged information.112  In these situations, to avoid possible disciplinary 
action, the attorney must make clear to the third party:  (1) who the attorney 
is representing and (2) that the third party should not disclose any privileged 
information.113 
For example, return to the previously discussed hypothetical involving 
documents disclosed by an opposing party’s former employee.114  However, 
now imagine that the lawyer is actually aware that the anonymous party 
sending the information is a former employee.  If the lawyer contacts the 
former employee, the lawyer would need to state who the lawyer is 
representing and should endeavor to ensure that additional protected 
information is not revealed.115  When evaluating the attorney’s conduct and 
determining whether sanctions are appropriate, the court’s inquiry focuses on 
 
 109. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b). 
 110. Solicitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 111. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(a). 
 112. See Arnold v. Cargill Inc., No. 01-2086, 2004 WL 2203410, at *7 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 
2004) (finding that, because the lawyer knew that the individual he was speaking to had 
extensive exposure to confidential and privileged information and yet the lawyer made no 
effort to protect those confidences, the lawyer violated Rule 4.4); see also Olson v. Snap Prod., 
Inc., 183 F.R.D. 539, 545 (D. Minn. 1998); Dubois v. Gradco Sys., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 341, 347 
(D. Conn. 1991). 
 113. See Gifford v. Target Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (D. Minn. 2010) (discussing 
how the lawyers properly cautioned the individual not to divulge attorney-client information); 
Dubois, 136 F.R.D. at 347 (requiring the lawyers to “make clear . . . the nature of the lawyer’s 
role in this case”). 
 114. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Gifford, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 1120. 
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the likelihood that the information gathered by the attorney was protected by 
privilege.116  To deter unethical and extralegal discovery by parties, when a 
lawyer plays an active role (such as soliciting the documents instead of 
passively receiving them), the court can prohibit the use of the tainted 
material.117  This serves to encourage lawyers to obtain the documents 
through ethical processes.118  Therefore, soliciting privileged or confidential 
documents is beyond the scope of this Note because these actions are 
generally considered unethical and prohibited rather than merely 
questionable.119 
2.  Illegally Obtained Documents 
Courts generally state that a lawyer who knowingly uses illegally obtained 
materials (e.g., evidence that the lawyer knows is stolen) clearly violates 
ethics rules.120  Courts in most jurisdictions are consistent in their rulings that 
lawyers may not use documents taken illegally or improperly (as 
distinguished from those inadvertently received).121 
There are many situations that do not involve solicited or illegally obtained 
documents, however.  While multiple courts have held that a lawyer cannot 
personally obtain documents illegally,122 there could be questionable 
situations if a document was obtained by an outside third party and the lawyer 
lacks knowledge of the circumstances surrounding how the document was 
obtained.123  Those questionable situations are exactly what this Note 
discusses in Part II. 
 
 116. See, e.g., Jose Luis Pelaez, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings LLC, 366  
F. Supp. 3d 567, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that ex parte conversation was acceptable “so 
long as measures are taken to steer clear of privileged or confidential information”); Olson, 
183 F.R.D. at 545 (finding no grounds for disqualification when the attorney was in contact 
with the adverse party’s CEO because the attorney alerted the CEO who he represented and 
did not ask the CEO to discuss privileged matters). 
 117. See Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Perna v. 
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 916 F. Supp. 388, 396–98 (D.N.J. 1995); Smith v. Armour Pharm. Co., 
838 F. Supp. 1573, 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
 118. See, e.g., Madanes 186 F.R.D. at 292.  Additionally, if a court were to find an ethics 
violation by a lawyer who passively received documents from a questionable source, there 
would be no deterrent value because the punishment would not fall on the wrongdoer, who 
may not even be involved in the litigation. See Perna, 916 F. Supp. at 400–01 (stating that an 
effective sanction must deter the individual, as well as others, from engaging in that behavior 
again). 
 119. See, e.g., Madanes, 186 F.R.D. at 292; Olson, 183 F.R.D. at 545; Dubois v. Gradco 
Sys., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 341, 347 (D. Conn. 1991). 
 120. JOSEPH T. MCLAUGHLIN & J. KEVIN MCCARTHY, CORPORATE INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATIONS—LEGAL PRIVILEGES AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE EMPLOYMENT LAW 
CONTEXT 950 (2001). 
 121. See 69 AM. JUR. TRIALS 411 Ethics in Adversarial Practice § 30 (1998). 
 122. See, e.g., Castellano v. Winthrop, 27 So. 3d 134, 137 (Fla. App. 2010). 
 123. See infra Part II. 
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II.  ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MANDATING NOTICE FOR 
ANONYMOUS DISCLOSURES 
Documents disclosed intentionally,124 rather than inadvertently, lie beyond 
the scope of the Model Rules.125  This part discusses anonymously delivered 
documents that the lawyer takes no active role in obtaining126 and that 
themselves are either privileged or protected by a combination of 
confidentiality and privilege.127  Courts have taken divergent views in this 
narrow realm of case law.128  Part II.A discusses the arguments for mandating 
notice for unauthorized disclosures.  Part II.B examines the opposite view 
and discusses the arguments against mandating notice for unauthorized 
disclosures. 
A.  Lawyers Should Notify Opposing Counsel of Anonymous Disclosures 
Various courts, state ethics opinions, ethics rules, and academics have 
examined whether inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures are sufficiently 
analogous to warrant expansion of the notice requirement derived from 
Model Rule 4.4(b) for anonymous disclosures.  Part II.A.1 discusses how the 
Model Rules and case law emphasize that the rules themselves should not 
end a lawyer’s inquiry into ethical obligations.  Part II.A.2 discusses the 
argument that, because there are no ethics rules on point, unauthorized 
disclosures should at least be treated the same as inadvertent disclosures and 
notice should thus be mandated.  Part II.A.3 briefly discusses the argument 
that, in these situations, a court’s interest in maintaining judicial integrity 
should outweigh any conflicting interests. 
1.  The Rules Should Not End the Inquiry into Ethical Duties 
The court system has repeatedly endorsed the idea that a lawyer’s ethical 
obligations do not end with the black letter law.129  The ethics rules make 
clear that the rules themselves should not end a lawyer’s inquiry—that just 
because the rules might not specifically address an issue does not allow the 
lawyer to conclude that nothing should be done to protect the document 
 
 124. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.A. 
 126. See supra Part I.E. 
 127. See supra Part I.C.2.c. 
 128. See infra Part II.  While many of the arguments discussed in Part II and emphasized 
in Part III can apply generally to all unauthorized disclosures, not just those anonymous 
third-party disclosures, this Note is limited in scope by arguing that the notice requirement 
should extend to the small facet of case law discussed in Part II. 
 129. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, at *10 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); see also Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the Federal 
Law of Attorney Ethics, 29 GA. L. REV. 137, 165–66 (1994) (“The prevailing viewpoint, 
however, seems to be that attorneys can be disqualified or disciplined even for conduct not 
prohibited under any applicable attorney-ethics code.  Some federal courts have stated that 
applicable codes are not an exhaustive list of ethical considerations, and that attorneys can be 
sanctioned for conduct not specifically proscribed by the court’s code.” (footnote omitted)). 
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owner’s privilege and confidentiality interests.130  Additionally, the preamble 
of the Model Rules notes that the Model Rules do not exhaust a lawyer’s 
ethical and moral considerations but simply provide a framework for ethical 
lawyering.131  Formal Opinion 06-440 reinforces that same point.132 
Unfortunately, as these sources acknowledge, a set of rules is not able to 
capture every single circumstance in which ethical questions and conflicts 
may arise.133  Commentators note that ethical rules are inherently limited and 
that lawyers must seriously consider their actions in situations when there is 
no rule clearly on point.134  Any set of ethics rules lacks “definition, depth, 
and applicability until and unless [the rules] are read along with the stories 
and narratives that illustrate their content, reach, and purpose.”135  Absent a 
rule on point, a lawyer should not immediately do what is in the best interest 
of the client but rather should consider the broader principles on which the 
rules rest.136  Requiring something that is clearly not present in the current 
ethical law forces lawyers to rely on their own judgment and ethical decision-
making to determine the proper conduct.137  As the court in Raymond v. Spirit 
AeroSystems Holdings, Inc.138 emphasized, “if something appears too good 
to be true, it probably is.”139 
The court in Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court of 
Nevada ex rel. County of Clark140 acknowledged that Nevada Rule of 
Professional Conduct 4.4(b)141 as written was not applicable to the 
anonymously sourced documents before the court, since the rule explicitly 
addressed only inadvertently disclosed documents.142  Nevertheless, the 
 
 130. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021); see also Raymond, 
2017 WL 2831485, at *10. 
 131. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. 
 132. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-440 (2006). 
 133. Trina Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and the Law of 
Mistake:  Using Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 EMORY 
L.J. 1255, 1282 (1999). 
 134. Id. at 1282–83. 
 135. Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching 
of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 175–76 (1996). 
 136. Jones, supra note 133, at 1295–96. 
 137. Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485,  
at *12 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017). 
 138. No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017). 
 139. Id. at *11 (quoting Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, 
at *5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010)). 
 140. 262 P.3d 720 (Nev. 2011). 
 141. The Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) is identical to Model Rule 4.4(b). 
NEV. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (2019); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 
4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
 142. Merits, 262 P.3d at 724.  In the state district court opinion, the court noted that 
plaintiffs did indeed notify the state district court that the plaintiffs had received these 
documents and that defendants took no action to “disavow [p]laintiff of the notion that they 
were fair game.” Bumble & Bumble Prods., LLC v. Merits Incentives, LLC, No. A557670-B, 
2010 WL 8034115, at *6 (Nev. Dist. Ct. June 11, 2010).  The court specifically commented 
that there was no discussion of whether the documents give plaintiffs an unfair advantage and 
therefore denied the motion for dismissal or disqualification. Id. at *6–7.  Additionally, the 
court noted that it did not find that defendants acted in bad faith but that, in light of the schedule 
2021] THE RISK OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY 1415 
court implemented a notice requirement for the documents and underscored 
the importance of lawyers looking beyond the scope of the black letter ethical 
rules.143 
2.  Treat Unauthorized Disclosures the Same as Inadvertent Disclosures 
Some courts, therefore, have held that, because there is no ethics rule on 
point, analogizing documents disclosed by an anonymous third party to 
inadvertent disclosures is valid and, thus, notice should be required for 
both.144  One scholar argued even more broadly that all unauthorized 
disclosures can be treated the same as inadvertent disclosures.145 
This Note, however, focuses on anonymously disclosed documents 
because multiple courts examining anonymous disclosures have expressed 
concern about the lack of knowledge regarding the source of the 
information.146  In both Raymond and Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan,147 the courts 
emphasized that the lawyer’s lack of knowledge surrounding the source was 
suspicious, criticizing “[d]efense counsel’s failure to provide more specific 
information.”148  If treated the same, then both inadvertent and unauthorized 
disclosures would require, at a minimum, notifying opposing counsel once 
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that someone erred by giving 
the lawyer the documents.149 
Treating inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures as the same for the 
purpose of determining proper conduct would minimize the ambiguity that 
riddles many of these situations.150  Several courts have endorsed this 
approach—or at least a form of it.  In Raymond, with minimal guidance from 
other case law, state ethics rules, or the Model Rules, the court decided that 
counsel had a duty to, at a minimum, notify the defendants of the received 
documents.151  In the case, former Spirit AeroSystems employees who were 
 
for trial, the court would have felt “a lot more comfortable” about the potential for 
disqualification if the motion had been brought up earlier. Id. at *8. 
 143. Merits, 262 P.3d at 724–25.  The Merits court noted, however, that the Burt Hill 
opinion was not persuasive because, in this case, the lawyer signed an affidavit in which he 
declared he had no knowledge of the source of the disk, thus eliminating any sense of 
wrongdoing on the part of the lawyer that the Merits court indicates was present in Burt Hill. 
Id. 
 144. See, e.g., Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *22; Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, at *4. 
 145. Fischer, supra note 20, at 229–36.  Fischer uses “privileged” to include materials 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, as well as confidential 
and proprietary information; in other words, Fischer’s terminology covers all of the types of 
information discussed in this Note. Id. at 202 n.1. 
 146. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *11; Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, at *4. 
 147. No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010). 
 148. Id. at *2; Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *11 (quoting Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, 
at *2). 
 149. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 234. 
 150. See id. at 233.  Fischer goes on to explain what a lawyer may do upon receipt of 
information that is unintentionally disclosed (the phrase he uses to describe both types of 
disclosures), such as whether the lawyer may or must return the document, use it, review it, 
or clarify the circumstances surrounding it. Id. at 240–48.  Other than the notification 
requirement, the rest of these issues are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 151. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *15. 
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members of a labor union brought a collective action against Spirit 
AeroSystems alleging employment discrimination.152  During the 
investigation into the viability of the claims, the director of the labor union 
provided the plaintiffs’ lawyer with a packet of documents he claimed were 
anonymously delivered to the union’s office.153  The Raymond court noted 
that it was “entirely appropriate to analogize” the unauthorized, anonymously 
disclosed documents to the inadvertently disclosed documents discussed in 
Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b).154  The court explained that the 
purpose of the rule was to permit the accidental sender to take proper 
protective measures.155  Emphasizing the documents’ “dubious origins,” the 
court said that the protections that are applied to inadvertently disclosed 
privileged or proprietary information should be at least the same, if not 
heightened, when the disclosure is clearly unauthorized.156 
In Burt Hill, one defendant received, from an anonymous source, 
privileged and confidential documents delivered in a manila envelope outside 
his office space and gave them to his attorneys.157  Defense counsel, unsure 
of what their ethical obligations were in these circumstances, sought advice 
from a lawyer with expertise in legal ethics and professional 
responsibility.158  The expert opined that retaining and reviewing the 
documents was permissible.159  The Burt Hill court, however, explained that 
the “justifications underlying the protections afforded to inadvertent 
products . . . apply with even greater, and stricter, force in connection with 
advertent but unauthorized disclosures.”160  Therefore, according to the 
Raymond and Burt Hill courts, the lawyers had a duty to notify opposing 
 
 152. Id. at *1. 
 153. Id. at *3–4.  Some of these documents were stamped “privileged” and were thus set 
aside and not used in the case, but the other documents were retained and used to prepare the 
plaintiffs’ complaint without notifying opposing counsel. Id. at *4–5.  The court said that 
“there appears to be no reason to distinguish between those documents marked privileged and 
those which are merely marked confidential or proprietary.” Id. at *16.  The Model Rules and 
the Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 4.4(b) do not distinguish between the two types 
of documents, so the court found it unnecessary to do so. Id. 
 154. Id. at *14.  An exact duplicate of Model Rule 4.4(b), Kansas Rule 4.4(b) reads:  “A 
lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the 
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document 
or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.” 
KAN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (2014). 
 155. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *14. 
 156. Id.  Plaintiffs objected to the decision by the magistrate judge. See Raymond v. Spirit 
AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 3895012, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 6, 2017).  
The objections were denied because the district judge found that the magistrate judge properly 
relied on case law and the inherent powers of the court to sanction misconduct, which is not 
limited by the ethics rules themselves. Id. at *4. 
 157. Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *1–2 (W.D. Pa. 
Jan. 29, 2010). 
 158. Id. at *5. 
 159. Id. at *2–3.  The expert opined that because the client did nothing to solicit the 
materials in question and the materials were provided before the litigation began, the relevant 
ethics rules did not apply. Id. at *3.  He commented that he “simply cannot find anything that 
would prohibit your use of the information in question.” Id. 
 160. Id. at *4. 
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counsel because “documents intentionally and anonymously produced 
should create a heightened awareness in both parties and counsel, and the 
mysterious nature of the production must also generate an amplified duty of 
notification.”161 
Chamberlain Group Inc. v. Lear Corp.162 involved an engineer who 
previously worked for the defendant company.163  The engineer sent an 
unsolicited email to one of the plaintiffs, and the continued communication 
ultimately led to the plaintiff’s receipt of unsolicited, privileged documents 
that were forwarded to the plaintiff’s counsel.164  The court in Chamberlain 
agreed with the Burt Hill court, “fail[ing] to see why” the duty to disclose an 
inadvertent receipt under Model Rule 4.4 “should cease where confidential 
documents are sent intentionally and without permission.”165 
Though it did not deal with anonymously disclosed documents, Stengart 
v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.166 provides another example of a court willing 
to extend Model Rule 4.4(b) beyond its plain text.167  This case dealt with a 
former employee filing an employment discrimination action.168  Her former 
employer retained a computer forensic expert to retrieve emails containing 
privileged and confidential information that was saved on the hard drive and 
later used in the course of discovery.169  Noting that the employer itself did 
not hack into the plaintiff’s account or perform any acts of bad faith,170 the 
New Jersey Supreme Court found that the employer’s counsel should have 
promptly notified opposing counsel when it discovered the nature of the 
emails, even if the emails were not inadvertently sent but rather provided 
intentionally by a third party.171  New Jersey later codified this result when 
it revised Rule 4.4(b) of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct to 
explicitly address wrongfully obtained documents and implement a notice 
requirement for such documents.172  Tennessee has also codified a similar 
 
 161. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *22. 
 162. 270 F.R.D. 392 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 163. Id. at 393–94. 
 164. Id. at 394–95.  The engineer’s identity was not known at the onset and was only 
discovered when the engineer and one of the plaintiffs planned to meet in person. Id. at 395. 
 165. Id. at 398 (emphasis added) (citing Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, at *4–5). 
 166. 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010). 
 167. See id. at 666. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 655. 
 170. See supra Part I.E. 
 171. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 666. 
 172. N.J. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (N.J. BAR ASS’N 2015).  New Jersey Rule 4.4(b) 
adds a separate section, after one that is very similar to Model Rule 4.4(b), that implements a 
notify-and-return requirement for lawyers who receive a document that contains privileged 
attorney-client communications or who have reasonable cause to believe the document or 
information was wrongfully obtained. Id.  Harris Davis Rebar, LLC v. Structural Iron Workers 
Local Union No. 1, Pension Trust Fund, No. 17-473, 2019 WL 447622 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2019), 
draws a similar analogy to Rule 4.4(b) for an intentional disclosure and deals with identified 
former employees providing internal documents to the opposing lawyers. Id. at *4–5.  The 
court noted that it found it “difficult to see why [the sending party’s known or anonymous 
identity] would matter” in this specific case. Id. 
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rule.173  These rules address an even broader scope of unauthorized 
disclosures than the scope of disclosures this Note focuses on. 
Although the ABA had two reasons for treating inadvertent disclosures 
differently from unauthorized disclosures,174 one scholar argues that these 
reasons do not provide a sufficient rationale for distinguishing these types of 
disclosures.175  Professor James Fischer says that the distinctions provided 
by the ABA are “elusive.”176  Both disclosures occur when someone erred, 
and the identity of the person who erred may be relevant to the question of 
waiver but does not differentiate between the two types of disclosures.177  
Second, the ABA’s speculation of a greater likelihood that unauthorized 
disclosure cases deal with information that shows improper or unjust 
conduct178 is “asserted, not established” because there was no evidence 
provided in the formal opinion other than anecdotal evidence.179  Whether 
the documents show evidence of improper conduct could impact the lawyer’s 
ability to use the information at trial, but this does not distinguish between 
the two types of disclosures at the moment the lawyer receives them.180  
Thus, Fischer argues, the best resolution when evaluating the proper conduct 
for both forms of disclosures is to use a single approach.181  A single 
approach would be fairer when evaluating the consequences because a 
lawyer will probably be unsure of how the documents were sent before at 
least reviewing the documents in some way.182 
In the cases discussed above, the courts emphasized that documents that 
are disclosed intentionally by an anonymous third party should be treated at 
least the same as those inadvertently disclosed.183  Therefore, Fischer and 
these courts argue that the notice requirement found in Model Rule 4.4(b) 
should be extended to include intentional disclosures, even if that 
requirement is not explicitly written in the rule. 
3.  Courts’ Interest in Maintaining Integrity Should Outweigh Other 
Interests 
In addition to analogizing to Model Rule 4.4(b), another argument for 
requiring notice is that courts have an interest in maintaining the integrity of 
the judicial system by prohibiting unethical, extrajudicial discovery.  The 
Raymond court posited this by detailing policy arguments and discussing 
how “obligations of decency, fundamental fairness, and frankly the golden 
rule” should have prompted the lawyers to notify opposing counsel of their 
 
 173. TENN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (2018). 
 174. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 175. Fischer, supra note 20, at 230–32. 
 176. Id. at 231 (emphasis added). 
 177. Id. at 232. 
 178. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 179. Fischer, supra note 20, at 232. 
 180. Id. at 232–33. 
 181. Id. at 233. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See supra notes 157–82 and accompanying text. 
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receipt of the documents.184  In that case, by holding on to these documents 
for over two years, plaintiffs’ counsel impermissibly sidestepped the 
authorized discovery process.185 
When the court in Raymond was determining the proper sanctions for the 
lawyers’ handling of the unauthorized receipt of an adverse party’s 
information, the court referred to two primary interests:  (1) the conduct of 
counsel itself and (2) the effects of that conduct, including whether the 
conduct was “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”186 
Similarly, the Burt Hill court concluded that using its inherent sanctioning 
power was warranted and cited numerous cases in which sanctions were 
fitting to punish the inappropriate avoidance of the formal discovery 
process.187  The court discussed how the defendants and their counsel were 
discontent with waiting until the formal discovery process concluded and 
therefore chose to inappropriately circumvent it.188  Finally, the Model Rules 
themselves acknowledge that lawyers do not need to “press for every 
advantage” for their clients but rather should aim to treat “all persons 
involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.”189  Therefore, these 
sources argue that, to maintain judicial integrity and order in the court 
system, lawyers should have a notification requirement for anonymous 
disclosures. 
B.  Lawyers Should Not Have to Notify Opposing Counsel of Anonymous 
Disclosures 
There are courts, states, and academics, however, that argue that notice 
should not be mandated for unauthorized disclosures.  This viewpoint leaves 
the question of ethical obligations in the event of unauthorized disclosures to 
other areas of law, such as the relevant evidence or civil procedure rules.  Part 
 
 184. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *14. 
 185. Id. at *15. 
 186. Id. at *16.  Ultimately, the court decided that disqualifying the entire firm of plaintiffs’ 
counsel would be detrimental to the plaintiffs’ case because it would limit plaintiffs’ access to 
counsel and therefore only pursued evidentiary sanctions regarding the use of the 
anonymously delivered documents. Id. at *17–19. 
 187. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 445 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (stating that 
“[f]ederal courts have authority to remedy litigation practices that threaten judicial integrity 
and the adversary processes” and that “[s]uch inherent authority includes the ability to 
‘exclude proprietary documents obtained . . . outside the context of formal discovery’” 
(quoting Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., No. 94-CV-0981, 1996 WL 34393321, at  
*5–6 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 1996))); Knitting Fever, Inc. v. Coats Holding Ltd.,  
No. 05-CV-1065, 2005 WL 3050299, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2005) (stating that when 
plaintiffs obtained documents from “an undisclosed . . . employee” of defendants, plaintiffs’ 
counsel had “a clear ethical responsibility to notify [defense] counsel and either follow the 
latter’s instructions with respect to the disposition of the documents or refrain from using them 
pending ruling by the [c]ourt”); Arnold v. Cargill Inc., No. 01-2086, 2004 WL 2203410, at 
*7–10 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 2004) (disqualifying plaintiffs’ counsel for using “privileged and/or 
confidential” documents obtained from defendant’s former employee). 
 188. Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 
29, 2010). 
 189. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
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II.B.1 describes the textualist view, emphasizing that the current ABA Model 
Rules and formal opinions explicitly chose to not include intentional 
disclosures.  Part II.B.2 describes the technocratic view, which argues that 
because there is no ethical rule on point, the lawyer should be free to act as 
the lawyer best sees fit.  Part II.B.3 discusses the argument that this issue is 
best left to other law. 
1.  The ABA Explicitly Leaves Unauthorized Disclosures Out of Its Rules 
As discussed, the ABA has clearly stated that all unauthorized disclosures 
are outside the scope of the ethics rules.190  Previously, the ABA has utilized 
a textualist approach and has limited the scope of Model Rule 4.4(b) to 
include only what is explicitly in the text of the rule.191  A previous formal 
opinion had addressed unauthorized disclosures, but it was later 
withdrawn.192 
Some courts have similarly decided that notice is not required given the 
absence of an explicit requirement in the ethical rules.  In Chesemore v. 
Alliance Holdings, Inc.,193 a federal district court in the Western District of 
Wisconsin declined to mandate notice for unauthorized disclosures.194  One 
plaintiff in this class action lawsuit against an employer instructed other 
employees to either send documents directly to counsel or to leave them with 
her “anonymously.”195  A current employee took advantage of this 
opportunity and “anonymously” gave valuable documents to the plaintiff, 
who then provided these documents to counsel.196 
The court found no wrongdoing on the lawyer’s part and held that the 
anonymous delivery may have suggested an orchestration of plausible 
deniability by plaintiffs’ counsel but noted that the situation was “still far 
from counsel affirmatively directing employees to reveal confidential 
documents.”197  The court held that, as long as the lawyer did not solicit the 
confidential information,198 there was no wrongdoing.199  Adhering closely 
to the exact wording used in Rule 4.4(b) of Wisconsin’s Rules of Professional 
 
 190. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
 193. 276 F.R.D. 506 (W.D. Wis. 2011).  This case is about certifying a proposed class for 
the lawsuit. Id. at 509. 
 194. Id. at 513–14. 
 195. Id. at 513. 
 196. Id. at 513–14. 
 197. Id. at 515–16.  However, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin 
did mention, without elaborating, that there may be policy reasons for sanctioning a lawyer 
for not providing notice in this situation but that defendants did not attempt to articulate them 
and “the ABA’s revision of its position on the matter weighs against such a view.” Id. at 515.  
The Raymond court distinguished the Chesemore opinion partially on this basis—that in 
Raymond, the parties clearly articulated policy arguments (which the Raymond court found 
persuasive). See Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485, at *12 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017). 
 198. See supra Part I.E.1. 
 199. Chesemore, 276 F.R.D. at 514. 
2021] THE RISK OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY 1421 
Conduct for Attorneys,200 the Chesemore court highlighted the narrow 
situation in which Rule 4.4(b) actually applies and refused to expand the 
scope of the rule.201 
Additionally, the Chesemore court noted that the Burt Hill case relied on 
withdrawn ABA opinions rather than the newest ABA Formal Opinion 
06-440,202 which revised the ABA’s position to not include a notice 
requirement in these cases.203  The court said that “the ABA’s revision on 
this matter weighs against such a view.”204  This approach adhered closely 
to the textualist approach that the ABA had previously engaged with respect 
to this controversy.205  However, the Raymond court disagreed with the 
Chesemore court’s interpretation of ABA Formal Opinion 06-440, because 
the Raymond court found that the formal opinion explicitly warns lawyers 
that the black letter rules must not end their inquiry into what the proper 
conduct is.206 
Furthermore, over two-thirds of states have adopted ethics rules that are 
almost identical to Model Rule 4.4(b).207  All of these jurisdictions have 
opted to follow the lead of the ABA and its version of Model Rule 4.4(b),208 
demonstrating that the issue of intentional disclosures must be beyond the 
scope of Rule 4.4(b) and, thus, notice should not be mandated.209  In Oregon, 
for example, Formal Opinion No. 2011-186 concludes that Rule 4.4(b), by 
its express terms, does not require a lawyer to take or refrain from taking any 
particular action with respect to documents that were sent purposely.210  
 
 200. Wisconsin’s Rule 4.4 implements a notification requirement (along with requiring the 
lawyer to stop reading the document) for inadvertently sent documents, much like Model Rule 
4.4(b). WIS. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT FOR ATT’YS r. 4.4 (2020); see MODEL RULES OF PRO. 
CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
 201. Chesemore, 276 F.R.D. at 515–16. 
 202. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 203. Chesemore, 276 F.R.D. at 515. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 11-460 (2011) (stating that “[a] 
‘document [is] inadvertently sent’ to someone when it is accidentally transmitted to an 
unintended recipient” but that “a document is not ‘inadvertently sent’ when it is retrieved by 
a third person from a public or private place where it is stored or left” (quoting MODEL RULES 
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021)); Kendrick, supra note 19, at 760 
(discussing how the Committee applied a textualist approach when crafting its formal 
opinions); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. 
Resp., Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) (proffering that if the receipt of “materials is not the result 
of the sender’s inadvertence, Rule 4.4(b) does not apply”). 
 206. Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485, at 
*12 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); see supra Part II.A.2; see also supra note 54 and accompanying 
text. 
 207. Becker, supra note 28, at 884–85. 
 208. See AM. BAR ASS’N, JURISDICTIONAL RULES COMPARISON CHARTS, RULE 4.4:  
RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_4_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/62P9-
B35B]. 
 209. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text. 
 210. Oregon State Bar, Formal Op. No. 2011-186 (2011).  This formal opinion does note, 
however, that if the documents contain evidence of a crime, the lawyer may have an obligation 
to make the evidence available to the prosecution under Rule 8.4(a)(4). Id.  This may not apply 
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These states, following the lead of the Model Rules, have chosen to leave 
unauthorized disclosures outside of the ethics rules. 
2.  A Lawyer Is Likely to Act in the Client’s Best Interests 
Absent an ethical rule on point, many commentators say that a lawyer is 
most likely to have one goal in mind:  pursuing whatever course of action is 
in the client’s best interests.211  Professor Heidi Feldman calls this 
“technocratic” decision-making, emphasizing that a technocrat will utilize 
any available weapon to secure the client’s ends or justify an already made 
decision.212  As a result of often inconclusive and conflicting ethics rules, 
technocratic decision-making has become more prevalent.213  A technocratic 
lawyer can develop defensible arguments for almost any position using the 
black letter law.214  A technocrat, therefore, will interpret the rules to permit 
pursuit of the client’s ends without considering other ethical concerns.215 
Professor Feldman further argues that the ethical statutory rules can 
actually elicit the technocratic style.216  While Feldman comments that she 
values uniformity and predictability, she argues that a good technocrat can 
produce valid arguments for interpreting codified legal rules in a wide variety 
of ways, resulting in a wide variety of behavior.217  Instead, Feldman argues 
for a common-law approach that would tend to narrow the spectrum of 
behavior.218  “A robust common law of lawyers’ ethics would provide 
constraining information about what sorts of situations create which ethical 
responsibilities.”219  She therefore seems to endorse the view that, absent a 
rule on point, notice should be discretionary and courts should determine on 
a case-by-case basis when notice should be required, creating guidelines for 
lawyers in the future with similar factual situations to follow.220 
In addition, Professor Monroe Freedman, one of the most widely cited 
proponents of zealous advocacy, argues that a lawyer has no duty to protect 
the confidentiality between the opposing side and its counsel and that the 
lawyer should not be forced to weigh this obligation of confidentiality more 
heavily than the lawyer’s own obligation to represent the client zealously.221  
His position also illustrates this “strong impulse towards technocratic 
 
if the documents are still entitled to protection under substantive law of privilege or otherwise. 
Id. 
 211. Jones, supra note 133, at 1283–84 (describing the flaws of rule-oriented decision 
making). 
 212. Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues:  Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical 
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 886–87 (1996). 
 213. Id. at 886 n.2. 
 214. Id. at 897. 
 215. Id. at 898. 
 216. Id. at 887. 
 217. Id. at 934. 
 218. Id. at 887. 
 219. Id. at 946–47. 
 220. See infra notes 243–51 and accompanying text. 
 221. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (3d ed. 
2004). 
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decision making.”222  For example, in an article published before the 
adoption of Model Rule 4.4(b), Freedman argues that lawyers should have 
the right to read and use any supposedly inadvertently sent document to help 
their clients’ cases—with no notice required—because the opposing lawyers 
did not take care to protect the documents from disclosure.223  This group of 
thinkers argues that zealous advocacy furthers autonomy,224 due process 
rights,225 and clients’ trust and confidence in their lawyers.226  Freedman 
asserts that counsel should take “all reasonable lawful means to attain the 
objectives of the client”227 and that any inadequacies in the Model Rules will 
“be overcome by tradition and corrected by interpretation.”228 
Professors Trina Jones and Andrew Perlman both discuss the possibly 
troublesome consequences of Freedman’s view.229  Jones argues that 
Freedman’s view encourages lawyers to become dismissive of or to 
oversimplify ethical matters not resolved by the Model Rules, by interpreting 
the rules as narrowly as possible to promote whatever is in the client’s best 
interest.230  Perlman emphasizes the lack of justification for Freedman’s 
view, which Perlman says leaves questions as to why zealous advocacy 
should be the “nearly exclusive factor” when determining one’s ethical 
obligations.231  In a response to Perlman’s article, Freedman emphasized that 
Perlman’s statement was wrong:  Freedman believes ethics are rooted in the 
Bill of Rights and in the autonomy and the dignity of the individual, which 
encompasses much more than simply zeal, as Perlman contended.232  
Therefore, there is an argument that zealous advocacy should outweigh any 
other conflicting interests, and thus lawyers should not have to provide notice 
to the opposing party if a rule does not require them to do so.233 
3.  Anonymous Disclosures Should Be Left to Other Law 
Federal courts and scholars following the view that Model Rule 4.4(b) 
does not apply to documents that are sent intentionally rely on the FRE, 
FRCP, and private agreements to determine what lawyers may or must do 
with these documents.234  Depending on what claim is brought in what court, 
 
 222. Jones, supra note 133, at 1284. 
 223. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 221, at 78–79 (criticizing suggestions that the 
“advocate’s zeal on behalf of a client should be constricted by moral standards that have not 
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 224. Id. at 71. 
 225. Id. at 23. 
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 227. Id. at 84 (quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986)). 
 228. Id. 
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 230. Jones, supra note 133, at 1284. 
 231. Perlman, supra note 75, at 791. 
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state laws may also govern.  For example, in Merits and Chesemore, each 
court decided that the scope of its state’s Rule 4.4 clearly excludes 
unauthorized disclosures, and therefore, other law should govern these 
situations.235 
One commentator, Professor Tory Lucas, argues that inadvertent 
disclosure decisions should be aligned with related outside law and that the 
rules of ethics should play only a supporting role.236  His solution, while also 
advocating for Fischer’s idea of treating both types of disclosures 
similarly,237 endorses the view that a receiving lawyer’s ethical obligations 
revolving around these disclosures should be left to applicable state or federal 
law.238  Leaving this determination to other law would protect every client 
with a fair system by ensuring that everyone knows the “rules of the 
game.”239  Furthermore, this would align Model Rule 4.4(b) with possible 
societal values on these types of disclosures:  to serve the interests of the 
client, the profession, and the justice system.240  Overall, Lucas’s analysis 
advocates for a simple revision of Model Rule 4.4(b)241 and asserts that the 
other relevant law does enough to govern this area of ethics.242 
Furthermore, this argument contends that the ABA obviously intended for 
the inquiry to be a fact-specific one that allows the courts to use their 
discretion when determining what is required of lawyers in the event they 
receive unauthorized disclosures.243  Intentional disclosures could concern a 
wide variety of cases, each with different interests weighing in favor and 
against obligations, such as a notice requirement.244  Instead of mandating 
notice (or any further ethical obligations, such as the obligation to stop 
reading or to return the documents), courts could look to factors and then 
conduct a balancing test.245  These factors could include:  impropriety of 
counsel’s conduct in obtaining the documents;246 the incentives and 
 
 235. Chesemore, 276 F.R.D. at 515; Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. of 
State, ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 262 P.3d 720, 724–26 (Nev. 2011). 
 236. Lucas, supra note 48, at 238. 
 237. Id. at 251 n.74. 
 238. Id. at 239. 
 239. Id. at 289. 
 240. Id. 
 241. His proposed amendment to Model Rule 4.4(b) is:  “The receiving lawyer shall use 
inadvertently disclosed documents or information unless prohibited by rules of evidence, rules 
of civil procedure, or private agreement.” Id. at 290. 
 242. Id.  Alternatively, the court in Burt Hill emphasized that the two types of documents 
should not be treated similarly, even though they found that the notice requirement from Rule 
4.4(b) could be used as a starting point for anonymous disclosures that are intentional. See 
Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A. 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *4 n.4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 
2010) (“Although rules and decisions regarding inadvertent disclosures present an appropriate 
starting point, the analogy, by definition, eventually loses its vitality.”). 
 243. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text; see also Perlman, supra note 75, at 
809–11 (arguing that notice should be discretionary on the part of the lawyer). 
 244. See Brado v. Vocera Commc’ns, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 245. See id. 
 246. See supra Part I.E; see also Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., No. 94-CV-0981, 
1996 WL 34393321, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 1996) (identifying the court’s primary concern 
as whether the attorneys encouraged or were involved in dishonest conduct); In re Shell Oil 
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disincentives of employees to wrongfully take documents;247 the prejudice 
to the opposing party;248 the court’s desire to pursue the truth when resolving 
a dispute;249 and the public policy motivations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,250 
which favors whistleblowers and allows them to remain anonymous.251 
For example, imagine a hypothetical in which a large pharmaceutical 
company unlawfully promotes certain products.  A whistleblower from 
within the company provides information revealing the criminal activity to 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  Here, that information from the 
whistleblower is valuable for protecting the public’s well-being.  This may 
be a situation in which the DOJ’s having to provide notice would cause more 
harm than good. 
In the cases discussed in Part II.A, many of the courts emphasized that 
because the documents were obtained without authorization from “dubious” 
origins and because of the source’s anonymity, notice should be required.252  
A fact-specific inquiry would allow the court to use its own discretion and 
weigh these interests, and such an inquiry is obviously what the ABA 
intended to occur in these situations.253  In the hypothetical above, a court 
could decide that public policy weighs in favor of allowing use of the 
documents disclosed.  Making notification discretionary would most 
effectively allow the court to balance the interests involved.254 
 
Refinery, 143 F.R.D. 105, 107–08 (E.D. La. 1992) (disallowing use of documents in litigation 
where counsel circumvented the discovery process by obtaining internal documents from a 
current Shell employee). 
 247. See JDS Uniphase Corp. v. Jennings, 473 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702–03 (E.D. Va. 2007) 
(finding employee liable for breach of contract for taking documents without authorization 
from his employer); Fayemi v. Hambrecht and Quist, Inc., 174 F.R.D. 319, 325–26 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (disallowing use of documents when the plaintiff took the documents). 
 248. See Brado, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 (involving an instance in which the only prejudice 
to the opposing party was merely the timing of the access to the documents, since they would 
have been produced through discovery anyway); see, e.g., Ashman v. Solectron, Corp.,  
No. C-08-1430, 2008 WL 5071101, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2008) (declining to exclude use 
of improperly taken documents and only ordering the documents’ return when the documents 
likely would have been produced through discovery). 
 249. See Brado, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1323 (“While the documents may supply greater detail 
and constitute a more reliable source of information, in that regard the documents thereby 
serve the paramount truth-seeking function of the Court.”); Lahr, 1996 WL 34393321, at *4 
(declining to suppress use of improperly taken documents in light of pursuing the truth and 
considering all relevant evidence). 
 250. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
 251. See generally JDS Uniphase Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 697. 
 252. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 254. Perlman, supra note 75, at 811 (discussing how consumer protection and morality are 
the two factors that favor mandatory notification for inadvertent disclosures, but that because 
zealous advocacy, legal analogies, and justice weigh against a legal obligation to notify, 
notification should be discretionary). 
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III.  REVISING THE ABA MODEL RULE 
As demonstrated, intentionally sent documents that are disclosed by an 
anonymous third party pose an ethical quandary for lawyers.255  With no 
clear guidance from courts, the ABA, or the majority of states, lawyers are 
left to guess what their ethical obligations are if they receive intentionally 
sent documents from an anonymous third party.256  All of the authorities 
addressed above seek to provide opportunities for efficient and inexpensive 
exchanges of information, while also drawing lines for how, when, and what 
information can properly be obtained.257  The varying standards adopted 
between the court systems create uncertainty for lawyers who find 
themselves in this situation,258 and creating a clearer standard would result 
in lawyers being less likely to attempt to push ethical boundaries.259 
This part proposes that the ABA revise Model Rule 4.4(b) to provide the 
clearest guidance for and most efficient solution to the problem of intentional 
disclosures by anonymous third parties.  A clear revised rule would minimize 
sanctions imposed on lawyers who previously had to navigate a vague rule 
and courts’ contradictory opinions.  Lawyers would be able to structure their 
behavior accordingly to avoid sanctions.  Clear and detailed rules that leave 
less discretion to the court system would minimize lawyers’ needs to seek 
the opinion of ethics professionals to deal with a situation or to expend time 
and energy to determine how to handle the documents correctly.260  The goal 
of the ABA Model Rules is not to cause more confusion but to provide 
guidance to the legal profession.261  Currently, Rule 4.4(b) does not serve 
that goal and needs to be revised. 
This section presents numerous solutions to the problem discussed in Part 
II.  Part III.A discusses why several of the justifications for not mandating 
notice for anonymous disclosures fall short of sufficiently addressing the 
issue.  Part III.B explains why the ABA should amend Model Rule 4.4(b) 
based on its position as the leading authority on legal ethics.  This section 
also proposes a revision for the ABA to consider.  Lastly, Part III.C explains 
why, should the ABA decline to amend the Model Rule, courts should 
exercise their discretion to implement a notice requirement for anonymous 
disclosures. 
A.  Extend the Notice Requirement to Anonymous Disclosures 
Notice should be required for anonymous disclosures in order to provide 
clear guidelines for lawyers dealing with these types of disclosures.  Part 
III.A.1 discusses why unauthorized and inadvertent disclosures are 
sufficiently similar and should be treated the same.  Part III.A.2 explains why 
 
 255. See supra Part II. 
 256. See supra Part II. 
 257. See Becker, supra note 28, at 883; see also supra Parts I.B, II. 
 258. See supra Part II. 
 259. See Lucas, supra note 48, at 289. 
 260. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
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the issue of notice and unauthorized disclosures should be addressed by 
ethics rules rather than left to other law.  Lastly, Part III.A.3 discusses the 
conflicting interests involved and explains why judicial integrity should 
outweigh the interest of a zealous advocate. 
1.  Inadvertent and Unauthorized Disclosures Are Sufficiently Similar 
First, there is a strong argument for why inadvertent and unauthorized 
disclosures are sufficiently similar to justify uniform treatment.262  The 
lawyer often has no idea how documents were obtained before receiving 
them, and therefore, streamlining the process to cover both inadvertent and 
intentionally disclosed documents is logical.  The courts in Burt Hill and 
Raymond noted that documents that are obtained in a questionable manner 
and disclosed without authorization probably deserve an even higher level of 
ethical obligation than those sent inadvertently.263  With this consideration 
in mind, implementing the same notice requirement for both types of 
disclosures is the bare minimum required to protect the information and the 
interests of the parties involved.  Furthermore, it seems nonsensical to apply 
a notice requirement to documents that are mistakenly sent to the lawyer, 
while allowing the lawyer to utilize documents that are, for example, 
anonymously delivered to the lawyer’s office.264  This is a distinction without 
a difference.  Furthermore, it has been argued that one party should not 
benefit from a mere clerical error resulting in inadvertent disclosures.265  
Accordingly, then, it seems clear that one party should also not benefit from 
a third party’s improper acts that result in intentional disclosures.  Therefore, 
the notice requirement that is mandated for inadvertent disclosures should 
also be extended to include anonymous disclosures. 
2.  Anonymous Disclosures Should Not Be Left to Other Law 
The argument that the governance of unauthorized disclosures should be 
left to other law is unavailing.266  Even in light of FRCP Rule 26267 and FRE 
502,268 there are still major gaps concerning documents that are disclosed 
intentionally, as all of these laws only discuss inadvertent disclosure.269  
Professor Perlman discusses how bar associations have consistently 
concluded that this topic indicates ethical concerns, so the idea that these 
open questions “are now somehow more appropriately dealt with outside of 
the realm of legal ethics is a dubious departure from past practice.”270  
 
 262. Fischer, supra note 20, at 231–32; see supra Part II.A.1. 
 263. Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485,  
at *14 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 
419433, at *4–5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010); see supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text. 
 265. See Jones, supra note 133, at 1322. 
 266. See supra notes 234–42 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Perlman, supra note 75, at 782. 
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Furthermore, none of the other law discussed makes a single mention of 
documents that are disclosed without authorization.271  Additionally, leaving 
it to other law becomes more complicated when dealing with lawyers who 
practice in multiple jurisdictions and would need to be aware of and 
understand nuances in each jurisdiction’s rules and contract laws.272  This 
gap in other law addressing intentional disclosures is evident because none 
of the above cases mention any other law as being highly relevant to the 
decision.273  The argument that unauthorized disclosures should be left to 
other law falls short of providing an efficient solution for how lawyers should 
deal with these types of documents. 
3.  The Need for Judicial Integrity Should Outweigh Zealous Advocacy 
Notifying the opposing party of what was received is not a difficult task, 
and it can be accomplished in minutes.  Notification allows the sending 
attorney to take protective measures for the document, communicate 
instructions on how to proceed with the documents or go to the court to 
ensure other steps are taken.274  While receiving lawyers would benefit from 
the opportunity to use documents to their client’s advantage, the judicial 
system must uphold its integrity and should require its lawyers to do the 
same.  The competing interests issue arises again,275 but here, the lawyer’s 
obligation to the judicial system should outweigh the other interests.  The 
Raymond and Chamberlain courts emphasized that allowing lawyers to 
receive and use these documents without notifying the other side seems to 
encourage extrajudicial discovery and should raise “red flags” for the 
lawyers.276  Extrajudicial discovery can encourage backdoor dealings and 
skullduggery and could create a slippery slope of decreasing ethical standards 
if a lawyer does not proceed through formal methods.  While the lawyer’s 
ultimate goal is to help the client, the lawyer must also uphold the integrity 
of the profession; allowing lawyers to utilize documents or information that 
was disclosed without authorization just because there is essentially a 
“loophole” does not serve the legal system well.277 
 
 271. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.  Lucas proposed to add the following 
text to the end of Rule 4.4(b):  “The receiving lawyer shall use inadvertently disclosed 
documents or information unless prohibited by rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, or 
private agreement.” Lucas, supra note 48, at 265.  This proposal would still cause confusion 
even when just dealing with inadvertent disclosures. Id.  In his article, he claims that 
unauthorized disclosures and inadvertent disclosures can be equated with one another, yet he 
proposes a solution that would only include “inadvertent disclosure.” Id. 
 272. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law, 69 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1161, 1163–64 (2001). 
 273. See supra Part II. 
 274. Pierson, supra note 100, at 1104–05. 
 275. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
 276. See Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485, 
at *11 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); see also Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 
392, 398 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 277. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
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Freedman’s argument that, without a rule directly on point, a lawyer 
should be left to pursue whatever means is in the best interest of the client is 
unreasonable.278  Lawyers must take various considerations into account—
such as the integrity of the lawyer, the profession, and the court system—
when they determine their applicable ethical duties.279  Any set of ethical 
rules is inherently limited, and there is simply no practical way for a set of 
rules to cover every situation in which lawyers may find themselves.280  
Instead of aiming to cover all these situations, the legal profession expects a 
lawyer to act reasonably, even if not specifically prescribed by a rule.  This 
might not always mean acting in the best interest of the client because a 
lawyer’s duty is not just to the client.281  Therefore, the interest of avoiding 
unethical extrajudicial discovery should outweigh the interest of the lawyer 
to zealously act without ethical bounds for the interests of the client.  Thus, 
notice should be mandated. 
All of these concerns appear even more relevant when dealing with 
disclosures from anonymous third parties, as the case law in Part II 
discussed.282  That the third party is maintaining anonymity at all implies a 
greater chance that something awry is occurring.283  Additionally, when 
documents are anonymously disclosed, the lawyer does not have a chance to 
question the third party to discuss how the third party obtained the documents 
or garner any specific details.  Thus, the need for judicial integrity in these 
situations, as supported by the courts in Merits and Raymond,284 should 
outweigh any conflicting interests. 
B.  The ABA Should Revise Model Rule 4.4(b) to Include Anonymous 
Disclosures 
The ABA should adopt a clearer standard to handle situations in which 
documents are intentionally disclosed without authorization by an 
anonymous third party.  It should do so by expanding Model Rule 4.4(b) to 
cover unauthorized disclosures of this type, thus implementing a notice 
requirement for both inadvertent and anonymous disclosures.285  Part III.B.1 
discusses why the ABA is in the best position to provide ethical guidance to 
the legal profession.  Part III.B.2 highlights why there is a need for clearer 
guidance for lawyers in this realm.  Part III.B.3 describes the proposed 
amendment to Model Rule 4.4(b). 
 
 278. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 221, at 84; see supra notes 221–33 and accompanying 
text. 
 279. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra Part II. 
 283. See supra Part II. 
 284. See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text. 
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1.  The ABA Is in the Best Position to Provide Guidance on Ethics 
The ABA is in the best position to create clear guidelines to address 
intentional, anonymous disclosures of unsolicited privileged or confidential 
documents.286  The ABA’s role in developing these professional conduct 
rules is to decide, if there are conflicting interests,287 which interests should 
prevail.288  Looking at the ABA’s history in addressing this issue,289 the 
previous Formal Opinion 94-382 did address unauthorized disclosures and 
seemed to indicate that ethics rules were the best way to address this issue.290  
After adopting Model Rule 4.4(b) and rescinding that formal opinion, the 
ABA failed to explain why intentionally disclosed documents are not 
included under Model Rule 4.4(b).291  Confusingly, now the ABA seems to 
indicate that these disclosures are better handled by sources of authority 
outside the realm of legal ethics.292  As one of the highest national ethics 
authorities the legal world has, the ABA should not continue to waffle on the 
matter.  Courts, states, and individual lawyers all look to the ABA for 
guidance.293  It is the ABA’s responsibility to provide clear instruction rather 
than leaving the determination to other law that does not adequately address 
the issue.294  The other relevant law is not always applicable,295 and 
ultimately, the issue of unauthorized disclosure and the requirement of notice 
to the opposing party are sufficiently ethics-related and deserve proper 
guidance.  Furthermore, a uniform model rule, which has been shown to 
influence many states to adopt an identical or similar version,296 could reduce 
forum shopping in cases in which a conflict of law analysis would apply.297  
People expect lawyers to act as advocates, not angels, and thus a revised 
Model Rule would serve to temper their zeal. 
2.  The Legal Profession Needs Clear Guidance About Anonymous 
Disclosures 
When it is difficult for lawyers to ascertain what their ethical obligations 
are, they are likely to fall short of fulfilling the bar’s expectations—even if 
 
 286. See Kendrick, supra note 19, at 776. 
 287. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
 288. See Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure:  The Lingering Need to 
Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 245–46 (2010) (discussing how the 
Model Rules require or permit an attorney to put the interests of an opponent, a court, or a 
third party ahead of the lawyer’s own client). 
 289. See supra Part I.B. 
 290. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text; see also Perlman, supra note 75, at 
782. 
 291. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 292. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 295. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Gloria A. Kristopek, To Peek or Not to Peek:  Inadvertent or Unsolicited 
Disclosure of Documents to Opposing Counsel, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 643, 680 (1999). 
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the failure is not done in bad faith.298  For example, in Burt Hill, the lawyer 
believed that he was fulfilling his ethical duties by following the black letter 
law that was relevant in the forum state.299  However, because the court chose 
to expand the scope of Rule 4.4(b), the court sanctioned the lawyer to remedy 
his ethical violation.300  Professional conduct rules should “say what they 
mean and mean what they say.”301  Since the ABA presumably wants lawyers 
in each jurisdiction to comply with the rules, it would be logical for the ABA 
to create clear rules that leave little room for interpretation.302 
By amending Rule 4.4(b) to include anonymously disclosed documents, 
lawyers would be left with fewer questions, and courts would not have to 
make discretionary judgments on a case-by-case basis.303  Leaving this 
determination to case law has clearly led to inconsistencies and is not a 
sustainable solution to an increasingly relevant problem.304  Furthermore, 
state courts should adopt these standards in order for the revised rule to have 
the force of law and to provide consistent ethical obligations across state 
borders, which would allow the rules to be integrated into federal courts. 
3.  Proposed Amendment to Model Rule 4.4(b) 
Amending Model Rule 4.4(b) by extending it to include intentional 
disclosures by an anonymous third party would help alleviate the concerns 
discussed in Part II.305  Model Rule 4.4(b) should be revised to read: 
(b)  A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information 
relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably 
should know that the document or electronically stored information was 
inadvertently sent, or was disclosed by an anonymous third party, shall 
promptly notify the sender.306 
In practice, this would resolve all the cases discussed in Part II.  All 
documents that are anonymously disclosed would automatically confer a 
 
 298. See Schaefer, supra note 288, at 241. 
 299. Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 
29, 2010). 
 300. Id. at *9–10. 
 301. See Schaefer, supra note 288, at 242. 
 302. Id. 
 303. See Kendrick, supra note 19, at 776 (proposing that the ABA “broaden [Model Rule 
4.4(b)’s] scope and make it applicable in circumstances where privileged or confidential 
documents are intentionally disclosed”); see also supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra Part II.  Compare Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-
1282, 2017 WL 2831485, at *14 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (requiring notice for an anonymous 
delivery of helpful documents), and Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, at *9 (same), with 
Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 506, 515–16 (W.D. Wis. 2011) (declining to 
require notice under similar facts). 
 305. As previously mentioned, many of the arguments discussed in Part II could apply to 
unauthorized disclosures more generally.  However, this Note proposes that this notice 
requirement only applies to the facet of case law dealing with the anonymous disclosures 
discussed in Part II. 
 306. The addition is shown in italicized text.  This Note acknowledges that this may cause 
problems with, for example, criminal cases.  However, since the ABA does not carve out an 
exception for criminal cases or SEC lawyers, for example, the edited rule similarly does not. 
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notice requirement on the receiving attorney, serving the interest of 
maintaining judicial integrity and encouraging lawyers to go through ethical 
discovery processes.307  Instead of questioning how anonymous disclosures 
fit within other law,308 a clear model rule that is adopted by the states309 
would better serve the legal community.310 
C.  Courts Should Exercise Their Discretion and Mandate Notice with 
Anonymous Disclosures 
If the ABA fails to make a new rule, courts should act based on their 
interest in maintaining judicial integrity, by expanding the notice requirement 
to anonymous disclosures.311  The inconsistency with which courts have 
handled documents that are disclosed from an anonymous third party makes 
it extremely difficult for lawyers to understand their ethical obligations, 
especially for those who practice in multiple state and federal courts.312  The 
courts, as the ultimate ethical authority, have the discretion to impose ethical 
duties as they see fit.313  Therefore, courts have the ability to implement a 
notice obligation for anonymous disclosures.314  While guidance by the ABA 
is preferred,315 the courts hold the authority to create a similar solution 
through their decisions.316 
When adopting such a solution, if there is no modification to the current 
ABA Model Rules and the jurisdiction has a Rule 4.4(b) that is identical or 
substantially similar to Model Rule 4.4(b), courts in that jurisdiction should 
follow the guidance from the courts that chose to expand Rule 4.4(b) and 
implement the notice requirement for documents that are disclosed from an 
anonymous third party.317  Courts should consider that the ethical rules are 
simply a starting point for determining a lawyer’s ethical duties and that the 
lawyer must look beyond them to determine their obligations.318  Therefore, 
any res judicata issues aside, the courts should use their discretion to 
 
 307. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra Part I.C. 
 309. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
 310. This is very similar to the approach taken in the Merits case, which implemented a 
notice requirement for anonymously provided documents. See Merits Incentives, L.L.C. v. 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of State, ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 262 P.3d 720, 725 (Nev. 2011). 
 311. See supra Part III.A. 
 312. See Ribstein, supra note 272, at 1163–64 (explaining that law firms with offices in 
different states are subject to a variety of ethical restrictions, often resulting in the firm’s 
adherence to the most restrictive standards in a manner that may be inefficient and ineffective 
for serving the firms’ clients in a particular jurisdiction); see also supra Part II. 
 313. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 314. See generally Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 
2831485 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 
419433 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010).  See also Merits, 262 P.3d at 720. 
 315. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 316. An individual court’s adoption of a notice requirement would be binding only in that 
court’s specific jurisdiction. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.  This is partially 
why a revised model rule is preferred:  because of its likelihood that the impact would be more 
widespread than a court decision, which would impact only that jurisdiction. Id. 
 317. See supra Part II.A. 
 318. See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text. 
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analogize documents disclosed from an anonymous third party to 
inadvertently disclosed documents and thus expand the notice requirement 
from Model Rule 4.4(b) to include both.319 
CONCLUSION 
In a world where accessing important information is increasingly easier, 
there is a prevalent need for a clear rule defining a lawyer’s obligations in 
questionable situations.  The ABA has continued to switch its position on a 
lawyer’s obligations upon the lawyer’s receipt of documents that are 
disclosed anonymously, and this has left lawyers speculating endlessly about 
their ethical obligations.  Model Rule 4.4(b) implements a notice requirement 
for inadvertent disclosures, explicitly leaving intentional disclosures to other 
law.  However, situations involving anonymous disclosures have resulted in 
numerous inconsistencies in different courts and jurisdictions.  It is unfair for 
lawyers to face ethical sanctions through no bad faith or fault of their own 
but rather because the ethical duties surrounding these documents are 
unclear.  Therefore, this Note proposes a revision to Model Rule 4.4(b) to 
include anonymous disclosures and encourages state courts to implement this 
revision to clarify the ethical obligations around these types of documents. 
 
 319. See supra Part III.A. 
